Published and accepted papers
Strategic Learning and Corporate Investment (with Paul Décaire)
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
[Internet Appendix]
The Consequence to Directors for Deploying Poison Pills (with William Johnson and Jonathan Karpoff)
Management Science, Forthcoming
Featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
[Internet Appendix]
Corporate Takeover Defenses (with Jonathan Karpoff)
in David J. Denis (ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance
(Debt) Overhang: Evidence from Resource Extraction
Review of Financial Studies, 34(4), 1699-1746, April 2021
[Published version] [Internet Appendix]
Colorado Finance Summit Best PhD Paper Award (2018)
Crisis Poison Pills (with Ofer Eldar)
Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 10(1), 204-251, March 2021
RCFS Rising Scholar Award (2022)
Solicited by the Editor
Featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
Selected Media Coverage: RCFS Spotlight Institutional Investor Bloomberg's Money Stuff Race to the Bottom
[Published Version] [Internet Appendix]
Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws (with Jonathan Karpoff)
Journal of Finance, 73(2), 657-714, April 2018.
[Published Version] [Internet Appendix]
Hedging House Price Risk with Futures Contracts after the Bubble Burst (with Patrick Schorno and Steve Swidler)
Finance Research Letters, 11(4), 332-340, December 2014.
[Published Version]
Current working papers
Resolving Estimation Uncertainty (with Paul Décaire and Denis Sosyura)
Presentations (* by co-author): Chicago Federal Reserve Bank (2025, Scheduled), American Finance Association (2025), SFS Cavalcade North America at Georgia State University (2024), Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research* (ABFER) (2024), University of Maryland Finance Conference (2024), University of Massachusetts Lowell (2024), Ohio State University (2024), Arizona State University* (2024)
Abstract: Economic models develop conceptual frameworks for fundamental decisions but rarely prescribe a specific estimation approach. Using novel data on the inputs and assumptions in professional stock valuations, we study how financial analysts address estimation uncertainty when calculating a firm’s cost of capital. Analysts use the same return-generating model (CAPM) but diverge in their estimation choices for key inputs, such as equity betas. Such estimation choices are driven by idiosyncratic analyst-specific criteria, persist throughout their career and across brokerages, and generate large cross-analyst variation in discount rates for the same stock. The dispersion in discount rates is associated with higher market measures of investor disagreement, such as trading volume. Overall, we provide micro evidence on how financial experts resolve estimation uncertainty.
The Rise of Anti-Activist Poison Pills (with Ofer Eldar and Tanja Kirmse)
ALEA Best Paper in Corporate Law and Governance Award (2023)
Presentations (* by co-author): Ohio State University (2024), NBER Summer Institute Corporate Finance Workshop (2024), Western Finance Association (2023), ECGI Global Corporate Governance Colloquium (2023), American Law & Economics Association (2023), SFS Cavalcade North America at UT Austin (2023), University of Cambridge Judge* (2023), Columbia Law School* (2023), Vanderbilt Law School* (2023), University of Texas Law School* (2023), Duke University Fuqua (2023), Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (2022), Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at University of Virginia* (2022), University of California Berkeley School of Law* (2022), Tel Aviv Buchmann Faculty of Law* (2022), Drexel Corporate Governance Conference Early Ideas Session (2022)
Abstract: We study contractual innovations in poison pills, focusing on low ownership thresholds and acting-in-concert provisions, as defensive tactics against shareholder activism. Leveraging unique data on hedge fund access to SEC filings as a proxy for intervention threats, we find that firms with highly-viewed filings are significantly more likely to adopt poison pills. Relative to other intervention-susceptible firms, those that respond by adopting pills experience fewer 13D filings, lower CEO turnover, and are less likely to adjust corporate policies commonly targeted by activists, such as reduced investment and increased share buybacks. Our findings inform policies regulating defensive measures against activists' interventions.
Production and Externalities: The Role of Corporate Governance (with Alvin Chen) (draft coming soon)
WRDS Best Paper Award at the Drexel Corporate Governance Conference (2024)
Presentations (* by co-author): Temple University (2024), Drexel Corporate Governance Conference (2024), Midwest Finance Association (2024), Boston College (2023), University of Iowa (2023), University of Wisconsin Madison Junior Finance Conference (2023), Finance Theory Group Summer School (2023)
Abstract: We study how corporate governance impacts firms' social costs. Our parsimonious principal-agent model with production externalities predicts that firms adopt high-powered incentives in response to increased monitoring costs. While this shift in governance mechanisms boosts production, it also leads to higher social costs. We confirm this prediction using asset-level data on production and workplace safety in the coal industry. To establish causality, we exploit plausibly exogenous increases in monitoring costs driven by the coal divestment initiatives of prominent activist institutional investors. Our findings highlight that firms' choice of governance mechanisms can have important implications for social and environmental performance.
Works in progress
How Do Firms Choose Project Discount Rates? (with Hoa Briscoe-Tran and René Stulz)
Intragroup Agency and the Insulating Power of Classified Boards (with Dhruv Aggarwal, Jonathan Karpoff and Lubomir Litov)
Non-finance publications and permanent working papers
Analyzing the Perceived Benefits of LEED-Certified and Energy Star-Certified Buildings in the Realm of Local Economic Development (with Dustin Read and Suzanne Leland),
Economic Development Quarterly, 29(4), 363-375, May 2015.
Is Public Equity Deadly? Evidence from Workplace Safety and Productivity Tradeoffs in the Coal Industry (with Erik Gilje)
Featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
[NBER Working Paper] [Internet Appendix] [Presentation Video]
Published and accepted papers
Strategic Learning and Corporate Investment (with Paul Décaire)
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
[Internet Appendix]
The Consequence to Directors for Deploying Poison Pills (with William Johnson and Jonathan Karpoff)
Management Science, Forthcoming
Featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
[Internet Appendix]
Corporate Takeover Defenses (with Jonathan Karpoff)
in David J. Denis (ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance
(Debt) Overhang: Evidence from Resource Extraction
Review of Financial Studies, 34(4), 1699-1746, April 2021
[Published version] [Internet Appendix]
Colorado Finance Summit Best PhD Paper Award (2018)
Crisis Poison Pills (with Ofer Eldar)
Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 10(1), 204-251, March 2021
RCFS Rising Scholar Award (2022)
Solicited by the Editor
Featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
Selected Media Coverage: RCFS Spotlight Institutional Investor Bloomberg's Money Stuff Race to the Bottom
[Published Version] [Internet Appendix]
Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws (with Jonathan Karpoff)
Journal of Finance, 73(2), 657-714, April 2018.
[Published Version] [Internet Appendix]
Hedging House Price Risk with Futures Contracts after the Bubble Burst (with Patrick Schorno and Steve Swidler)
Finance Research Letters, 11(4), 332-340, December 2014.
[Published Version]
Current working papers
Resolving Estimation Uncertainty (with Paul Décaire and Denis Sosyura)
Presentations (* by co-author): Chicago Federal Reserve Bank (2025, Scheduled), American Finance Association (2025), SFS Cavalcade North America at Georgia State University (2024), Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research* (ABFER) (2024), University of Maryland Finance Conference (2024), University of Massachusetts Lowell (2024), Ohio State University (2024), Arizona State University* (2024)
Abstract: Economic models develop conceptual frameworks for fundamental decisions but rarely prescribe a specific estimation approach. Using novel data on the inputs and assumptions in professional stock valuations, we study how financial analysts address estimation uncertainty when calculating a firm’s cost of capital. Analysts use the same return-generating model (CAPM) but diverge in their estimation choices for key inputs, such as equity betas. Such estimation choices are driven by idiosyncratic analyst-specific criteria, persist throughout their career and across brokerages, and generate large cross-analyst variation in discount rates for the same stock. The dispersion in discount rates is associated with higher market measures of investor disagreement, such as trading volume. Overall, we provide micro evidence on how financial experts resolve estimation uncertainty.
The Rise of Anti-Activist Poison Pills (with Ofer Eldar and Tanja Kirmse)
ALEA Best Paper in Corporate Law and Governance Award (2023)
Presentations (* by co-author): Ohio State University (2024), NBER Summer Institute Corporate Finance Workshop (2024), Western Finance Association (2023), ECGI Global Corporate Governance Colloquium (2023), American Law & Economics Association (2023), SFS Cavalcade North America at UT Austin (2023), University of Cambridge Judge* (2023), Columbia Law School* (2023), Vanderbilt Law School* (2023), University of Texas Law School* (2023), Duke University Fuqua (2023), Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (2022), Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at University of Virginia* (2022), University of California Berkeley School of Law* (2022), Tel Aviv Buchmann Faculty of Law* (2022), Drexel Corporate Governance Conference Early Ideas Session (2022)
Abstract: We study contractual innovations in poison pills, focusing on low ownership thresholds and acting-in-concert provisions, as defensive tactics against shareholder activism. Leveraging unique data on hedge fund access to SEC filings as a proxy for intervention threats, we find that firms with highly-viewed filings are significantly more likely to adopt poison pills. Relative to other intervention-susceptible firms, those that respond by adopting pills experience fewer 13D filings, lower CEO turnover, and are less likely to adjust corporate policies commonly targeted by activists, such as reduced investment and increased share buybacks. Our findings inform policies regulating defensive measures against activists' interventions.
Production and Externalities: The Role of Corporate Governance (with Alvin Chen) (draft coming soon)
WRDS Best Paper Award at the Drexel Corporate Governance Conference (2024)
Presentations (* by co-author): Temple University (2024), Drexel Corporate Governance Conference (2024), Midwest Finance Association (2024), Boston College (2023), University of Iowa (2023), University of Wisconsin Madison Junior Finance Conference (2023), Finance Theory Group Summer School (2023)
Abstract: We study how corporate governance impacts firms' social costs. Our parsimonious principal-agent model with production externalities predicts that firms adopt high-powered incentives in response to increased monitoring costs. While this shift in governance mechanisms boosts production, it also leads to higher social costs. We confirm this prediction using asset-level data on production and workplace safety in the coal industry. To establish causality, we exploit plausibly exogenous increases in monitoring costs driven by the coal divestment initiatives of prominent activist institutional investors. Our findings highlight that firms' choice of governance mechanisms can have important implications for social and environmental performance.
Works in progress
How Do Firms Choose Project Discount Rates? (with Hoa Briscoe-Tran and René Stulz)
Intragroup Agency and the Insulating Power of Classified Boards (with Dhruv Aggarwal, Jonathan Karpoff and Lubomir Litov)
Non-finance publications and permanent working papers
Analyzing the Perceived Benefits of LEED-Certified and Energy Star-Certified Buildings in the Realm of Local Economic Development (with Dustin Read and Suzanne Leland),
Economic Development Quarterly, 29(4), 363-375, May 2015.
Is Public Equity Deadly? Evidence from Workplace Safety and Productivity Tradeoffs in the Coal Industry (with Erik Gilje)
Featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
[NBER Working Paper] [Internet Appendix] [Presentation Video]